This webinar is intended for researchers and doctoral students in economics who are interested in resource and environmental economics. The webinar is led by a team of researchers composed of Geir B. Asheim (Oslo University), Hassan Benchekroun (McGill University), Sophie Bernard (Polytechnique Montréal), Etienne Billette de Villemeur (Université de Lille, UQAM), Robert Cairns (McGill University), Justin Leroux (HEC Montréal), and Charles Séguin (UQAM).

This webinar on natural resource and environmental economics will host Arnaud Dragicevic, an international faculty member at the Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University, Thailand, and an associate researcher at CIRANO, and Felix Muñoz-Garcia, Professor in Economics at Washington State University. Arnaud Dragicevic specializes in bioeconomics and socio-ecological systems and will present "The Tragedy of the Commons as a Complex System Emergent Property". Felix Muñoz-Garcias field of research is industrial organization and environmental regulation and he will present "Environmental Policy: An Unintended Booster of Competition Policy?".

→ This event will be online and in English.

• Arnaud Dragicevic (Chulalongkorn University, CIRANO)
  The Tragedy of the Commons as a Complex System Emergent Property

Abstract

This study models the Tragedy of the Commons as an emergent property of a complex adaptive system using a dynamic agent-based framework that integrates ecological and economic dynamics. By incorporating non-linear interactions, feedback loops, interconnectedness, adaptive behaviors, and stochastic processes, the model simulates how individual agents exploit a shared renewable resource. The effectiveness of various policy interventions – taxes, quotas, market exclusion, and cap-and-trade – is assessed. Findings reveal that taxes, quotas, and cap-and-trade systems effectively mitigate the Tragedy of the Commons by altering agents’ incentives and stabilizing resource stocks, though each exhibits different impacts on economic activity and resource sustainability. In contrast, market exclusion mechanisms prove ineffective, as agents intensify exploitation prior to exclusion, accelerating depletion. The research deepens the understanding of resource management in complex systems and contributes to complexity economics by moving beyond traditional assumptions of equilibrium and optimality.

• Felix Muñoz-Garcia (Washington State University)
  Environmental Policy: An Unintended Booster of Competition Policy? 
  Coauthored with Ana Espinola-Arredondo

Abstract

We investigate how environmental regulation affects the effectiveness of competition policy (audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs) at deterring collusion in polluting industries. When competition policy is absent, the presence of environmental regulation does not affect the sustainability of collusion. When competition policy is present, however, we show that environmental policy amplifies the effectiveness of audits, leniency, and whistleblower programs at deterring collusive practices. Our results suggest that leniency and whistleblower programs can reduce rewards in regulated industries without diminishing their impact. Our findings are robust to environmental regulation being endogenous, production costs being convex, and firms competing in prices.